● Eisenkot would have the US declare public “kill zones” around the remaining Iranian sites holding 60% enriched uranium (under rubble or storage), with a standing commitment to strike any movement of nuclear material and long-term aerial monitoring modeled on 1990s Iraq no-fly operations.

● A “good deal” in his view permanently removes Iran’s nuclear threat via anytime-anywhere inspections; he rejects any agreement that merely delays the program and is no more willing than Netanyahu to accept a weak deal.

● He would reopen the Strait of Hormuz to ease global economic pressure, focus Israeli-US effort solely on the nuclear file, bomb site entrances, and demand removal of the stockpile (enough for roughly 10 bombs) while expanding Israel’s own strike capacity.

● Covert Mossad operations would resume and widen beyond nuclear scientists and facilities to include Iran’s ballistic-missile program, which Trump has publicly downplayed.

● Eisenkot argues Iran’s “win by not losing” strategy (preserving nuclear and missile remnants) requires a complete shift from Netanyahu’s multi-front, regime-pressure approach to a narrower, enforceable nuclear containment policy if talks fail.

● Dahiya doctrine: hit enemy centers of gravity with disproportionate firepower against military and dual-use infrastructure so the other side pays a price that deters the next round, not a symmetric duel.  

● Campaign between wars (MABAM): keep grinding Iran’s nuclear, missile, and proxy pipelines with covert and limited overt strikes so Tehran never reaches a finished bomb or a free hand in Syria and Lebanon.  

● “Kill zones” on Iran’s leftover nuclear sites: declare the remaining 60% uranium locations no-go areas, watch them 24/7, and strike anyone who tries to move or rebuild—then demand the stockpile leave the country.  

● Fight on their soil: Israel has no strategic depth, so the war must be pushed into Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran’s facilities; hold buffer zones only as leverage for a deal, not as endless occupation.  

● Doctrine over improvisation: write a real national security plan, define end-states (Hamas out, Hezbollah cut from Iran, nuclear file closed), and use force only when capability, necessity, and legitimacy line up—not as a substitute for strategy.